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FOREIGN IPO CAPITAL MARKET CHOICE:  UNDERSTANDING THE 
INSTITUTIONAL FIT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
While product market choices have been central to strategy formulation for firms in the past, the 
integration of financial markets makes the choice of capital markets an equally important 
strategic decision.  We advance a comparative institutional perspective to explain capital market 
choice by firms making an IPO in a foreign market.  We find that internal governance 
characteristics (founder-CEO, executive incentives, and board independence) and external 
network characteristics (prestigious underwriters, degree of venture capitalist syndication, and 
board interlocks) are significant predictors of foreign capital market choice by foreign IPO firms.  
Our results suggest foreign IPO firms select a host market where the firms’ governance 
characteristics and third party affiliations fit the host market’s institutional environment.   
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FOREIGN IPO CAPITAL MARKET CHOICE:  UNDERSTANDING THE 
INSTITUTIONAL FIT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Strategic decisions essentially relate to issues of domain selection and domain navigation 
(Bourgeois, 1980).  Therefore, not surprisingly, much of the research in the strategic 
management area surrounds the product market choices made by firms.  Certainly, the initial 
choice of the product market domain is one of the most important decisions that a firm will 
make.  However, firms often need external financial resources in order to capitalize on growth 
opportunities provided by their chosen product markets.  Hence, a firm’s initial choice of capital 
market in which to make its first public equity offer is an equally important domain choice 
decision for a variety of reasons.  An initial public offering (IPO) of equity represents a critical 
stage of development, which is often referred to as the “re-birth” or “re-start” of the organization 
(Finkle, 1998: 6).  Organization theorists emphasize the importance of the IPO threshold and the 
infusion of funds from the sale of equity because it represents a significant shift in the strategic 
choices open to the firm (Certo et al., 2001).  As Fama and French (2004: 229) explain: “It is the 
point of entry that gives firms expanded access to equity capital, allowing them to emerge and 
grow.”  Finally, Deeds et al. (2004) stress the importance of legitimacy to IPO performance.  
Hence, a greater fit with the institutional environment should lead to higher levels of legitimacy 
for a foreign IPO firm and ultimately result in higher levels of performance.  Therefore, an 
analysis of factors that affect a firm’s choice of capital markets is of crucial importance for better 
understanding of the strategic dynamics of firms.   
Historically, firms opting to ‘go public’ were mostly confined by legal reasons to offer 
their shares only on the exchanges in their country of origin.  However, globalization and 
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integration of international capital markets have greatly expanded the choices available to firms 
seeking equity capital.  For example, in recent years, many firms which are already publicly 
listed on their home exchanges, have ‘cross-listed’ in order to offer their shares in foreign capital 
markets.  In addition, there is an emerging class of firms that choose to forego their domestic 
stock market entirely and make their initial public offering in a foreign market.  There has been 
very little prior research on why these firms choose to forego their domestic capital markets or 
how they choose among foreign capital markets.  In recent years, scholars have explored the 
decision IPO firms face when choosing between domestic stock exchanges (Bruton and Prasad, 
1997), and the choice between a domestic or a foreign public offering (Ding, Nowak, and Zhang, 
2010, Blass and Yafeh, 2001).  Although these studies have emphasized the importance of 
strategic choices firms make when considering equity finance, the studies did not explore 
contextual factors that may affect these choices. Given that firms undertaking an IPO can select 
among multiple foreign markets, what is conspicuously missing is an investigation of the 
institutional and firm-level factors that influence the choice between foreign capital markets.  
The focus of this paper is to fill these theoretical and empirical gaps in strategy scholars’ 
understanding of a firm’s strategic choice.   
A number of studies indicate that corporate governance characteristics may play a critical 
strategic role in improving stakeholder perceptions of foreign firms and thus improve their stock 
market performance (Bell, Moore, Al-Shammari, 2008).  For example, Coffee (2002) suggests 
that by adhering to high governance standards, foreign firms may “bond” with investors and 
improve their stock market valuations.  Although this research does further the linkage between 
foreign IPO firm’s performance and its governance characteristics, it does not explain the 
characteristics of the firm that drive its choice of a particular listing market in the first place.  
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More specifically, why would foreign firms with similar characteristics such as size, age, 
industry affiliation, country of origin, etc. make very different choices regarding whether to 
undertake their IPO in the United States (U.S.) or United Kingdom (U.K.)?  Although research in 
finance (e.g., Blass and Yafeh, 2001; Pagano et al., 2002) suggests that market choice may have 
important implications in terms of visibility, media recognition, and the ability to raise additional 
equity or debt and management of investor expectations, yet it still does not explain how firms 
decide between markets that generate similar benefits.  
Today, the vast majority of firms that decide to make their initial public offering outside 
their home country do so by listing their stocks in either the U.S. (i.e., New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) or NASDAQ located in New York) or U.K. (i.e., London Stock Exchange 
(LSE) or Alternative Investment Market (AIM) located in London).  Our objective in this paper 
is to develop understanding about how firms make the strategic choice of where to list their 
shares on a foreign market exchange.  More specifically, we seek to answer the question: “Can 
the firm’s governance characteristics predict whether it would choose U.S. or U.K. exchanges for 
its IPO, ceteris paribus?”  We address this question by postulating that the firm’s choice among 
foreign capital markets is mainly driven by the extent to which its organizational characteristics 
conform to the institutional environment of a particular market.  New firms offering shares to 
investors in a foreign capital market clearly have to contend with issues, including liability of 
foreignness (Hybels, 1995; Zaheer, 1995; Zaheer and Mosakowski, 1997) and liability of 
newness  (Certo, 2003; Singh, Tucker, and House, 1986).  In order to be successful in its share 
offering, firms have to overcome these liabilities by attaining legitimacy in the foreign 
institutional context by conforming to the norms and expectations prevailing in that market (cf. 
Deephouse, 1996). 
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We make a number of contributions to the strategic management literature.  First, by 
focusing on capital market choices by firms, we advance the research on domain selection, which 
was previously treated exclusively as product-market choices.  Prior research has failed to 
recognize that a firm’s initial choice of a capital market in which to make its first public equity 
offering is an equally important domain choice decision.  Second, our study provides theoretical 
and empirical insights into the impact of corporate governance characteristics and third party 
certifying agents on the foreign IPO’s choice of listing in one of two capital markets destinations 
with different institutional settings.  Specifically, we examine the contrasting contexts of the 
U.K. and the U.S settings.  Although both countries are associated with the “common law” 
family of corporate governance, they differ in important ways that lead us to expect differences 
in the salience of the IPO firm’s characteristics and their external networks.  This is an important 
contribution as IPO research has so far tended to imply that governance factors and third party 
certifying agents have a universal impact that applies in the same way in different institutional 
settings (see Daily, Certo, Dalton, and Roengpitya, 2003; Sanders and Boivie, 2004; Certo, 
Daily, and Dalton, 2001).  We remove this restrictive assumption by following studies that 
attempted to incorporate concepts from economic sociology into understanding strategic 
decisions (Zajac and Westphal, 2004b).  
We integrate corporate governance research with institutional theory to develop and test a 
comprehensive explanation of capital market choice by firms that decide to forego domestic 
markets in making their IPOs and therefore contribute to the research on foreign IPOs. We focus 
on the firm’s corporate governance characteristics—such as the extent of its professionalization, 
internal monitoring, and managerial incentives—and consider the degree to which they are 
isomorphic within different institutional contexts.  We argue that factors affecting the firm’s 
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conformity with formal national institutions, such as those that create corporate governance 
regulation, will affect the firm’s choice between various stock exchanges.  Given that economic 
action is shaped by the structure of social relationships, the specific networks that a firm is 
embedded in might also influence its choice of exchange.  We extend previous research by 
investigating institutional embeddedness of the firm’s external board interlocks and its 
association with third party certifying agents, such as venture capitalists (VCs) and bank-
underwriters.  We argue that board interlocks and third party networks help a foreign IPO 
increase its embeddedness with informal institutions, and influence its choice of foreign market.  
Finally, we test our research hypotheses using a unique, hand-collected sample of foreign IPOs 
that listed in the U.S. and U.K. during the 2002-2006 period.  
INSTITUTIONAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN U.S. AND U.K. CAPITAL MARKETS 
Institutional theory provides an alternative explanation to firm behavior proffered by neoclassical 
economics, arguing that firm behavior can be understood in terms of “preconscious understandings 
that organizational actors share, independent of their interests” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 3).  
Rather than making predictions based on utilitarian (i.e., economic) bases, institutional theory 
identifies social mechanisms that explain organizational behaviors.  Consequently, strategic 
decisions that fail to make rational, economic sense can be understood from a more socialized 
perspective by examining those decisions vis-à-vis key stakeholders.  So, in addition to 
instrumental, economic considerations, the formulation of strategy involves the need to provide 
justifications for strategic decisions and behaviors that are considered legitimate by organizational 
stakeholders (Neilsen and Rao, 1987).  As a result, the field of economic sociology has emerged 
and grown as an area of study to investigate economic phenomena from a sociological perspective 
(Zajac and Westphal, 2004a, 2004b).  In fact, the institution-based view of the firm argues that 
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strategy emerges from the effect of institutions, in addition to industry and firm-level 
considerations (Peng, Wang, and Yi, 2008). Institutions constrain firm behavior by communicating 
the “rules of the game” and what is considered legitimate (Meyer and Rowen, 1977; DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983).  Suchman (1995: 574) argues that legitimacy is “possessed objectively, yet created 
subjectively”, suggesting that legitimacy is a socially conferred status resulting from evaluations 
by other stakeholder groups.  Thus, a firm’s legitimacy is based on the shared beliefs of a referent 
social group and socially constructed through the interaction of the firm and its environment.   
Because organizations compete in dynamic environments, they often tend to imitate those 
firms that are perceived to be successful organizations.  As a result, firms adopt practices of 
organizations that appear to be successful, based on salient properties perceived through market 
interactions and considered legitimate by the institutional environment (Zajac and Westphal, 
2004b).  When firms mimic successful firms in their competitive environments, organizations 
become identified as socially legitimated (Deephouse, 1996, 2000; Deephouse and Carter, 2005).  
The institutional understanding of legitimacy views instrumental reward as peripheral to the social 
construction of belief systems that create audience reactions and managerial decisions (Suchman, 
1995).  Consequently, social reasons, coupled with economic considerations, factor into the market 
choice decisions made by firms.    
Institutional environments present especially important social referents to a foreign firm 
considering the strategic decision of where to make initial equity offers. As a result, we expect the 
institutional differences between the U.S. and U.K. capital markets to be predictive of market 
choice decisions made by foreign IPOs.  North (1990) specifies that formal institutions consist of 
laws and regulations, political and economic rules and procedures, and other explicit constraints on 
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firm behavior.  Alternatively, informal institutions consist of those unwritten, yet quite influential, 
societal norms, conventions, and values (North, 1990).   
First, while the U.S. emphasizes formal regulation, in the U.K. the preference has been for 
informal voluntary codes.  Second, the U.S. environment relies primarily on arm’s length market 
transactions due to its faith in the efficiency of markets, while in the U.K. transactions are 
facilitated and shaped by dense social networks wherein reputation of the actors plays a central 
role.  Finally, the U.S. approach to resolving the problem of divergence between the interests of 
shareholders and managers has primarily relied on incentive alignment, while in the U.K. greater 
emphasis has traditionally been placed on monitoring.  An understanding of these fundamental 
institutional differences helps to provide general perceptions of what constitutes “good 
governance,” identify powerful stakeholders in these two markets, and explain the exchange listing 
decisions of foreign IPOs. This institutional argument suggests that firm-level characteristics 
interact with institutional environments to jointly affect the strategic choices of firms (Deephouse 
and Carter, 2005). 
The institutional environment of the U.K. is perhaps best described by Cain and Hopkins 
(1980, 1986), who characterized the nature of the intermingled economic, social, and political 
power, centered in the City of London, as “gentlemanly capitalism”. Gentlemanly capitalism is 
based on a preference for voluntary action over law and is related to a preference for “collective 
individualism” (Currie, 1979), where free agents acting collectively may seek to regulate affairs 
and develop norms and codes of practice through strong ties between networks of influential 
individuals and organizations. Gentlemanly capitalism is legitimated through the notion that 
voluntary rules and regulations should be obeyed, rather than legislatively mandated.  Gentlemanly 
behavior formed part of the habitus of key elite groups spanning the City and government, and 
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were supported by a dense network of social ties built upon the importance of trust and reputation.  
Indeed, the informal institutional environment of the U.K. is such that dense social networks and 
patterns of interaction lead actors to know one another, and  reputations and social networks are 
particularly effective at governing firm behavior (Cassis, 1994; Collins, 1991; Kynason, 1994, 
1999, 2001).  Furthermore, key actors are concentrated in a geographically small area, which 
reinforces the dense social structure of strong ties (Coleman, 1990). 
The “gentlemanly capitalism” framework helps explain why the U.K. has long tended to 
rely on a strong tradition of voluntary self-regulation in areas related to listing, takeovers, and 
accounting (Cain and Hopkins, 1986).  In recent years, this tradition has gained further importance 
through the development of a set of codes for corporate governance, which have culminated in the 
Combined Code (2010).  The U.K. Companies Act of 2006, the major legislative framework that 
regulates public and private companies in the U.K., does not specify rules that should define the 
firm’s corporate governance mechanism; instead it is focused on the legal responsibilities of 
directors to the company.  Companies are guided on governance matters by the Combined Code 
(2010) and listing requirements monitored by the U.K. Listing Authority.  A number of more 
recent, government-commissioned corporate governance reviews in the U.K., such as Higgs 
Review and Walker Report, have re-enforced self-regulation principles underpinning the Corporate 
Governance Code used by the U.K. Listing Authority to guide IPO firms in terms of their 
governance arrangements.  The Financial Reporting Council responsible for general oversight of 
the firms’ compliance with the Code provides the following summary of the U.K. approach to 
corporate governance: “The more ingrained the system of corporate governance in a business 
community, the less is the need for detailed regulation to ensure effective compliance with good 
standards of business behaviour” (FRC, 2006: 1). 
 11 
Interestingly, despite the prominence of the Combined Code (2010), compliance with the 
U.K. “Code of Best Practice” is not mandatory1.  Firms are free to not comply as long as an 
explanation is provided for any deviation.  Supporters of comply-or-explain systems contend they 
are built upon the concept of principles, rather than strict regulation (Hubbard and Thornton, 
2006), which allows firms the ability to modify and adapt their corporate governance policies to 
their particular needs.  
The voluntary regulative approach found in the U.K. stands in contrast to the more formal 
regulative traditions found in the U.S.   The U.S. developed an extensive body of securities and 
corporate law (i.e., ‘hard law’) at both the Federal and State levels. The most recent manifestation 
of the hard law approach in the U.S. was the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002, in 
which the U.S. Congress mandated new and more stringent governance regulations and increased 
the costs of non-compliance to all public firms, both foreign and domestic.  Through legislative 
action, SOX required firms to put in place a number of measures intended to reduce conflicts and 
enhance the role of independent directors.  While SOX is just one legislative effort that mandated 
governance and heightened transparency of public firms in the U.S., it is indicative of the coercive 
regulative environment found in the U.S.   
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
At the very heart of the vast majority of IPO studies in finance and management literatures is the 
question of how an unknown, privately held company can convey its “true” value to public 
market investors when it undergoes a stock market listing (Ritter and Welch, 2002).  Within this 
framework, there is a growing body of research that is focused on the signaling properties of 
corporate governance factors associated with an IPO firm.  Previous studies have recognized the 
                                                 
1
 Similar codes of governance have been adopted in Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, Germany, Hong 
Kong, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, and Sweden 
(Hubbard & Thornton, 2006). 
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signaling properties of a wide variety of governance factors, such as non-founder 
(”professional”) CEO, board independence, third party certifying agents (e.g., venture capitalists 
and underwriters), and board “interlocks”  (Beatty and Zajac, 1994; Certo et al., 2001; 2003; 
Daily et al., 2005; Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002).  Despite differences in theoretical 
perspectives, these studies have one common element: they assume that IPO firms can improve 
stock-market performance by using “good governance” signals that convey its high value to the 
public market investors (Bell et al., 2008; Moore, Bell, and Filatotchev, 2010; Sanders and 
Boivie, 2004).   
Although stock market participants in the U.S. and the U.K. share similar views on the 
factors that contribute to “good corporate governance” (e.g., board independence, transparency, 
etc.), substantial variation exists between the two common law countries in terms of corporate 
governance regulatory traditions and the relative importance of business networks, as we argued 
above.  This leads to distinct isomorphic pressures in each institutional environment.  Thus, the 
prevalence of voluntary codes in the U.K., in contrast to the coercive regulative environment of the 
U.S., prompt stock-market participants within these markets to place different relative weights on 
the roles and functions of corporate governance and third party certifying agents. Similarly, 
network-related aspects, such as informal contracts, trust and reputation may have particularly 
higher importance in the U.K. compared to the U.S. As a result, these institutional differences play 
a significant role in the exchange listing decisions of foreign IPOs.  When a foreign firm is 
choosing between a listing in the U.S. or U.K., it is more likely to choose the market where its 
characteristics are considered legitimate (Sanders and Boivie, 2004).  In other words, firms are 
more likely to choose the institutional context with which their governance characteristics have the 
most conformity.   
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In the following sections, we highlight how the network-based nature of the gentlemanly 
capitalism framework found in the U.K. emphasizes the network-related aspects of corporate 
governance.  Conversely, the more coercive regulative nature of the U.S. market places greater 
weight on the governance characteristics most consistent with the professionalization of a foreign 
IPO firm’s governance system.  Accordingly, we discuss how various internal governance 
characteristics of the firm, as well as its external ties and resultant legitimacy would affect its 
choice of capital markets. 
Internal Governance Characteristics 
 
The role of governance characteristics in the context of IPOs has been the subject of considerable 
research in recent years (Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002; Nelson, 2003).  Following previous 
research, we focus on three internal governance characteristics: the level of professionalization 
of the management team (e.g., presence of founder-CEOs), managerial incentives (e.g., executive 
stock options), and board monitoring (measured as board independence), that are likely to affect 
a firm’s choice of capital markets. 
Founder-CEOs 
Previous studies often acknowledge that, when transitioning to an IPO stage, founder-CEOs are 
likely to realize the limitations of their own knowledge and experiences, and delegate decision-
making authority to externally hired executives and independent members of the company’s 
board.  Certo et al. (2001) suggest that the biases of the founders, their over-optimism with 
regard to the venture’s success, and their managerial capabilities could be somewhat tempered by 
professional directors who provide additional high quality, firm-specific information.  Thus, the 
prevailing view among scholars in the U.S. is that founder-CEOs who take their firm public 
represent untested management (Wat, 1983).  The market’s disapproval of founder-CEOs is 
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further evidenced by the finding that founder-led firms are subject to greater underpricing (Certo 
et al., 2001).  Consequently, the practice of replacing founder-CEOs with professional CEOs 
represents a legitimated institutional logic in U.S. capital markets.  In contrast to the U.S., 
however, founder-CEOs seem to be the legitimate norm in the U.K. (Filatotchev, 2006). 
 There are compelling institutional explanations for the divergence in preference regarding 
professional versus founder-CEOs between the U.K. and U.S.  In the U.S., making the transition 
to life as a publicly held corporation in a new institutional environment governed by regulatory 
institutions may be especially difficult for IPO firms without leadership accustomed to the new 
and diverse legal challenges of the capital market.  U.S. investors perceive that founder-CEOs of 
foreign IPOs will experience considerable difficulties adjusting to the short-term performance 
expectation of U.S. investors, while simultaneously adhering to the ongoing heightened 
transparency requirements imposed on U.S. public firms.  Once a foreign IPO becomes public in 
the U.S., it is confronted by different laws, regulations, and press scrutiny.  Indeed, founder-
CEOs may have been quite successful in understanding the rules and practices of their own 
country as a private firm, yet may not have the skills required to grow their firm, while 
simultaneously adhering to the mandatory governance, disclosure, and transparency obligations 
associated with the legislated requirements of the U.S. capital market (e.g., SOX).  Finally, 
recent research finds that board independence, as regulated in the U.S., is associated with an 
increase in the probability that founders will be replaced as CEO when going public in U.S. 
capital markets (Jain and Tabak, 2008).  For all of the above reasons, founder-CEOs are less 
likely to be perceived as legitimate leaders of their firms when they become public in the U.S., 
where institutional pressures to professionalize the management of the firm are embedded.  
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In contrast to the U.S., the U.K.’s  “comply-or-explain” approach to corporate governance 
rules means that founder-CEOs may be under less pressure to develop an immediate and in-depth 
understanding of the rules and regulations.  For example, the Financial Reporting Council that 
oversees the implementation of the Combine Code principles in the U.K. recognizes that 
“governance should support, not constrain, the entrepreneurial leadership of the company, while 
ensuring that risk is properly managed” (FRC, 2006: 5). 
Apart from differences in formal governance regulations, there are also nuanced 
differences in informal and cultural aspects of governance in the two countries.  Within the 
network economy of the City of London, a high level of professionalization signals a lower level 
of network embeddedness.  In a network economy with strong reputation considerations, having 
a founder still at the firm’s helm may help the firm achieve relatively better results, since 
reputation is easier to associate with an individual than a management team.  When institutional 
context is more appreciative of leadership, personal charisma, and the networks of entrepreneurs 
than the individual skills and professional experience of hired professional managers, having a 
founder-CEO presents an advantage.  This founder-centered model of corporate governance in 
UK IPOs seems to be supported by existing empirical evidence. For example, Filatotchev et al. 
(2006) found that in the vast majority of newly listed firms (95%) in the U.K., founders continue 
to lead the firm either as a CEO or as a Chairman, indicating both widespread prevalence and 
social acceptance of this practice.  Similar results have been reported by Bruton et al. (2009) as 
well.  Other studies have found that founders of U.K. IPOs have a strong impact on the 
development of their firm’s governance characteristics, such as board independence and 
selection of non-executive directors (Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002). 
 16 
The above arguments and empirical evidence clearly suggest that founder-CEOs are more 
prevalent and valued in the U.K capital market, while professionalization is more likely to be 
valued in the U.S.  Accordingly, we hypothesize that 
 Hypothesis 1:   Foreign IPOs led by founder-CEOs are more likely to list in the 
U.K. 
 
Executive incentives  
Beatty and Zajac (1994: 317) emphasize the primacy of incentive alignment to resolve agency 
problems in IPO firms, and one of the central prescriptions found in agency theory literature is 
the development of  outcome-based contracts for executives (Fama and Jensen, 1983). These 
contracts should be designed to include appropriate incentives in the compensation plan.  Studies 
have shown that stock-based compensation has a positive impact on stock market returns and 
legitimacy (Sanders and Boivie, 2004).  This has prompted Zajac and Westphal (1994: 121) to 
suggest, “corporations can and should increase their control over top managers by increasing the 
use of managerial incentives and monitoring by the board of directors.”   
Studies based on U.S. IPOs demonstrate that U.S. investors look favorably upon IPO 
firms that offer options to their executives (Sanders and Boivie, 2004; Certo et al., 2003).  In 
fact, stock-based executive compensation is so prevalent in the U.S. (Coombes and Watson, 
2001) that it has  achieved “taken for granted” or legitimate status (Sanders and Boivie, 2004: 
171) among financial and business community members, suggesting that U.S. investors place 
greater emphasis on this monetary measure as the preferred incentive alignment mechanism.  
Studies comparing executive compensation in the U.S. and U.K. have found that the sensitivity 
of executive compensation to increases in shareholder wealth is much greater in the U.S. than in 
the U.K. The difference between the two countries is largely attributable to greater share option 
awards in the U.S. (Conyon and Murphy, 2000).  Stock options are particularly appealing in the 
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eyes of U.S. shareholders because of their explicit nature, favorable tax treatment under U.S. 
accounting rules, the assumption that managers are individuals solely motivated by self-interest 
and extrinsic rewards, and the non-egalitarian ethos of the U.S..  In light of the greater 
acceptance of stock options in the U.S. capital market, we expect that foreign firms that use this 
type of incentive mechanism would find a higher degree of institutional conformity when listing 
in the U.S.   
While incentive plans account for 60% of total executive compensation in the United 
States,  incentivized compensation is far less prevalent in other institutional contexts and 
accounts for only 22% of executive compensation in the U.K. (Watson Wyatt Worldwide, 2009).  
In their study of executive compensation in U.K. IPO firms, Allcock and Filatotchev (2009) 
found that a large proportion of firms did not have any executive compensation schemes at all, 
and less than half of the firms that had executive share option plans had some form of 
performance criteria attached to them.  In the U.K. institutional context, executive share options 
often contradict prevailing culture, contingencies, and coalitions of interest (Buck and Shahrim, 
2005).  When investors rely on reputational considerations rather than formal equity-based 
incentives in evaluating the probability of self-serving behavior of managers, presence of 
executive share options would have relatively lower salience.   
In the U.K., there is considerable public debate with regard to incentive properties of 
executive share options.  Over the late 1980s and early 1990s, the levels of executive pay were 
felt by many to have increased dramatically and unjustifiably (Smith et al., 1995). Although 
these concerns have been exacerbated in the past by excesses in the financial sector, they stem 
from a much wider perspective of social justice linked to growing inequalities in income and 
wealth generated in many European economies, including the U.K.  
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The U.K. Companies Act (2006) does not regulate the structure of executive 
compensation, instead specifying the content of a directors’ remuneration report and that it 
should be approved by the board (Sections 420-422).  Specific regulations introduced under the 
Act include a new provision that requires listed companies to report on how pay and employment 
conditions of all employees were taken into account in determining directors’ pay, including 
stock options.  More generally, investors and their professional associations in the U.K. impose 
restrictions on the way companies may use executive share options.  For example, remuneration 
committees are expected to prepare a statement on remuneration policy, which should include an 
assessment of the impact of executive share options on the firm’s risk profile and employee 
behavior.  These practices are now reflected in “Remuneration Code” introduced by the U.K. 
Financial Services Authority in August 2009. 
Despite arguments that U.S.-style incentive plans may diffuse to other parts of the world 
due to factors such as foreign institutional ownership (Fiss and Zajac, 2004; Sanders and 
Tuschke, 2007), evidence currently points in the opposite direction, as new legislation in the 
U.K. has created even less incentive for the use of stock options.  Instead, the emphasis in 
governance reform has been on transparency and disclosure, rather than stock options.  North 
(1990) argues that laws reflect an important element of formal institutions.  In the case of the 
U.K., it is clear that stock-based incentives are not yet “built into the institutional framework.”  
These arguments lead us to hypothesize that  
Hypothesis 2:  Foreign IPOs with executive stock options are more likely to list in 
the U.S. 
 
Board independence 
 
Board independence is defined as the presence of directors who do not have any personal 
professional relationships with the firm, its subsidiaries or affiliates, or firm’s management 
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(Daily and Dalton, 2003).  Beatty and Zajac (1994) argue that, when executive incentive 
mechanisms fail to align interests of managers and investors, IPO firms should rely more heavily 
on board monitoring. An independent board may be one of the most important favorable 
governance signals that U.S. investors expect when evaluating unfamiliar firms (Bell, Moore, 
and Filatotchev, 2011).  Independent boards that possess a diverse set of skills and experiences 
are considered important to investors (Useem et al., 1993) because they imply the firm will be 
better governed and capable of attaining higher performance levels (Millestein and MacAvoy, 
1998).  Furthermore, in their survey of U.S. institutional investors, Gillan and Starks (2003) 
found that board practices were considered as important as financial performance.  The SEC has 
a regulatory requirement that all publicly listed firms in the U.S have a board consisting of at 
least half independent directors, in addition to having key board committees filled by 
independent members.  When an IPO firm demonstrates its willingness to adhere to heightened 
governance standards legitimated by the U.S. regulatory environment, investors will be more 
willing to respond with increased demand for the new issue.  
While independent directors fill much of the traditional monitoring role for firms in the 
U.S., in the U.K., the Companies Act does not differentiate between executive and independent 
directors.  According to U.K. law, each board member has the same legal responsibility with 
regard to the focal company.  The U.K Combined Code is less concerned with the monitoring 
capacity of independent directors, asserting, “the board’s role is to provide entrepreneurial 
leadership of the company within a framework of prudent and effective controls” (Combined 
Code, 2010: 9).  Although the Combined Code (2010) advises that, at least half of the board in 
FTSE350 companies should comprise non-executive directors
2
, it puts a great deal of emphasis 
on the governance roles of a Senior Independent Director (SID).  The Combined Code suggests 
                                                 
2
 Smaller companies should have at least two independent directors 
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that the SID’s  role includes providing a sounding board for the chairman and serving as an 
intermediary for the other directors and shareholders, especially in conflict situations.  In fact, 
the Aggarwal et al., (2009) study found the percentage of independent directors in the U.K. to be 
32% versus 89% in the U.S. Overall, board independence in the U.K. is a less salient or 
legitimate governance signal.   
There are other institutional factors at play that may affect the salience of board 
independence as the IPO firm’s governance signal in the U.S. and U.K.  Generally, investors in 
the U.K. have more power in terms of appointing and removing board members, and shareholder 
resolutions with regard to board changes are legally binding.  In the U.S., the absence of majority 
voting that would require directors to attain the backing of most of their investors and the non-
binding nature of shareholder proposals mean that it is more difficult for shareholders to appoint 
a new director and dispose of a non-performing one, relative to the U.K.  As a result, investors 
may expect that board structure at an IPO may persist for some time and put a premium on IPOs 
with more independent boards.  In the U.K., investors may be less concerned with board 
independence at an IPO, since they have relatively more power to change it ex post.  
The foregoing clearly suggests that while investors expect effective monitoring in both 
markets, the monitoring function is carried out differently in the U.S and U.K.  In the formal 
law-driven institutional environment of the U.S., the role of monitoring is carried out by 
independent directors.  On the other hand, U.K. markets rely extensively on informal networks 
and the role of monitoring is mainly expected to be carried out by an independent Chairman and 
SID.  These arguments suggest that the salience of board independence in the U.K. will be lower 
than in the U.S.  Therefore, 
Hypothesis 3:  Foreign IPOs with independent boards are more likely to list in the 
U.S. 
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Legitimation Through External Ties 
Firms undertaking IPOs in foreign markets face problems associated with liability of foreignness 
and therefore undertake measures to reduce such liability.  One approach to reducing the liability 
of foreignness is certification by third parties, such as highly prestigious underwriters or venture 
capital firms who enjoy credibility in that market.  Board interlocks also play a role similar to 
third party certification in that they represent the ties that the firm has to other firms that are well 
established.  Accordingly, in this section, we develop hypotheses regarding the relationship 
between capital market choice and the legitimacy of these three types of external ties in the U.S. 
and U.K. capital markets.  We base our logic for the hypotheses, in part, on the different 
approaches associated with gaining socio-political legitimacy versus cognitive legitimacy.  
Socio-political legitimacy is attained formally through the certification of powerful stakeholder 
organizations, such as legal entities, government organizations, or other powerful organizations 
(e.g., highly prestigious underwriters).  On the other hand, cognitive legitimacy arises from the 
development of an informal reputation through information exchange that is embedded in social 
networks with strong ties (Baum and Oliver, 1991), such as those associated with venture capital 
syndicates.   
Prestigious underwriters 
Socio-political legitimacy is conferred in market economies by the endorsement of legal 
authorities, government bodies, or other powerful organizations, and is associated with increased 
access to resources and greater rewards (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Hannan and Carroll, 1992).  As 
Rao (1994: 31) notes, “the very act of endorsement embeds an organization in a status hierarchy 
and thereby builds the reputation of an organization.”  Therefore, a relationship with a high-
status partner can be considered a powerful endorsement for the unfamiliar firm and thus act as a 
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reputational source of legitimacy (Baum and Oliver, 1991).  However, the reputational value of 
endorsements by third parties may not carry the same weight across all institutional contexts.   
Among third party stakeholders (e.g., auditors, law firms, etc.), it is underwriters (usually 
investment banks) who have the most influence in the success of IPOs.  Previous research has 
identified a number of ways the highly prestigious underwriters may positively affect IPO 
success (Carter and Manaster, 1990; Carter, Dark and Singh, 1998; Jain and Kini, 1999; 
Loughran and Ritter, 2004).  First, highly prestigious underwriters may use their reputation to 
certify the quality of a foreign IPO, and, thereby reduce adverse selection problems associated 
with new issues (Stiglitz, 1985).  Second, highly prestigious underwriters may be involved in 
active post-issue monitoring to protect their reputation assets and reduce ex post moral hazard 
problems associated with potential insider opportunism after the listing (Pollock, Porac and 
Wade, 2004).  Finally, highly prestigious underwriters deal with top public market investment 
institutions experienced in monitoring their portfolio companies, which creates a cascading effect 
of monitoring.  Studies have demonstrated that more prestigious underwriters have a greater 
capability to attract additional analysts (O’Brien and Bhushan, 1990) and maintain close ties to a 
large base of institutional investors, who can serve as effective monitors of the firm (Woidtke, 
2002; Gillan and Starks, 2003).  All of these factors reduce agency conflicts associated with new 
issues and should improve IPO performance.  However, they also come at a cost, and previous 
research indicates that more prestigious underwriters charge higher fees compared to second-tier 
banks (Oxera, 2008).  To attract IPO firms, less prestigious underwriters rely more on their 
exclusive network of investment clients and competitive pricing structure.  Indeed, Brau and 
Fawcett (2006) indicate that CFOs in firms backed by high-prestige underwriters select 
underwriters based on reputation, quality, expertise, and institutional investor client base.  By 
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contrast, CFOs in firms backed by low-prestige underwriters are more concerned with valuation 
promises, retail investor client base, and fee structures. 
Differences in the regulatory and information building environments can significantly 
influence the capital raising activities of firms with different types of underwriters.  For example, 
in the U.S., communications between underwriters and investors are highly structured according 
to the 1933 Securities Act.  The Act requires that investors receive financial and other significant 
information concerning securities being offered for public sale and prohibits deceit, 
misrepresentations, and other fraud in the sale of securities.  Section 5 of the Act prohibits any 
‘‘offer’’ prior to the filing of a registration statement.  Investors in U.S. offerings are only asked 
to reveal their views about the IPO once the registration statement, including an initial indicative 
price range, has been filed.  During the registration period, and for 40 days after the IPO (the 
‘quiet period’), the company and its advisors are able to present statements of fact, but are not 
allowed to publish any opinions regarding the valuation of the company (Ritter, 2003).  Because 
of the highly regulated approach to information building associated with new listings, the 
reputation and ex post monitoring by highly prestigious underwriters in the U.S. are particularly 
important in dealing with both adverse selection and moral hazard problems associated with new 
issues. 
In contrast, the IPO process in London stems from a less strict interpretation of securities 
laws and an environment that has few formal regulations that prescribe the details of how an 
offer should be conducted (Jenkinson, Morrison, and Wilhelm, 2006).  In fact, stock exchange 
rules and underwriting regulations across European capital markets tend to establish general 
principles, rather than specify rules regarding particular offering methods (Jenkinson et al., 
2006).  More importantly, the exchange of information between investors and the investment 
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banking syndicate can occur earlier in London and with much less formality in the dense 
networks of the City of London.  In contrast to the U.S., research analysts associated with a U.K. 
investment banking syndicate routinely produce written research reports prior to the offering’s 
registration, which are then fed into the network.  Similarly, key investors within the bank’s 
network are offered meetings with the syndicate’s analysts to discuss the offering.  They are then 
asked for feedback regarding the price at which they would subscribe.  In fact, it is not unusual 
for investment banks to request responses to extensive questionnaires that survey the key 
investor’s investment strategy and holdings, as well as the investor’s reaction to the company 
and their thoughts on valuation (Jenkinson et al., 2006).  This information then diffuses within 
the underwriter’s network of investors, creating an information cascade, which is different than 
the monitoring cascade associated with prestigious underwriters in the U.S.  This information 
cascade may make reputational and monitoring effects of prestigious underwriters less relevant 
in the U.K. when investors try to ascertain the “true value” of a foreign IPO.  
Therefore, we contend that foreign IPOs consider the differential salience of underwriter 
signals in their choice of U.S. or U.K. capital markets.  As we have mentioned previously, in the 
U.K. there is considerable interaction between buy-side and sell-side IPO participants prior to 
registration.  During the pre-registration period, research is circulated by analysts working for the 
lead managers and, sometimes, more junior syndicate members (Jenkinson et al., 2009).  These 
pre-registration interaction with potential investors in the bank’s network are strictly prohibited 
in the U.S. Jenkinson et al., (2009) stress that there is much less information available for U.S. 
investors to utilize as a basis for their opinion regarding  the appropriate price.  In such an 
environment, the certification role of highly prestigious underwriters becomes very important to 
investors.  In contrast, it is quite possible that the informal informational cascades that begin 
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much earlier in the U.K. between buy-side participants could substitute for highly prestigious 
underwriters in the minds of foreign IPO managers.  Given that the U.K. institutional 
environment fosters such an informal dialogue early in the IPO process among buy-side and sell-
side participants, foreign IPO managers would consider highly prestigious underwriters to be less 
imperative in the U.K.  Hence,  
Hypothesis 4:  Foreign IPOs with more prestigious underwriters are more likely 
to list in the U.S. 
 
Venture capital syndicates 
  In addition to socio-political legitimacy, cognitive legitimacy is another important 
dimension of overall legitimacy (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Hannan and Carroll, 1992).  Cognitive 
legitimacy is conferred when an organization is considered appropriate within a widely shared 
system of norms and values (Zucker, 1986).  This type of legitimacy arises from the 
development of an informal type of reputation that is embedded in social networks with strong 
ties.  IPO studies have increasingly recognized that among large-block investors, venture 
capitalists may have a particularly strong reputational effect because of their early involvement 
in the strategic development of the fast-growing firm (Carpenter, Pollock, and Leary, 2003).   
Within an institutional framework, the role of a VC syndicate can be related to the IPO 
firm’s cognitive legitimacy.  As Pollock (2004) points out, the primary market for IPOs is an 
interesting example of a mediated market.  In mediated markets, the social capital of a broker can 
significantly shape market outcomes.  Venture capital syndicates typically possess higher 
amounts of social capital related to their informal networks, which include various stakeholders 
such as financiers, political actors, IPO advisors, and VCs.  Network embeddedness provides a 
structural and/or relational safeguard against opportunistic behavior because of the effects a 
negative reputation can have on future relations (e.g., Gulati, Nohria, and Zaheer, 2000).  Prior 
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research has indicated that the closeness and trust existing between actors serves as a social 
lubricant for ongoing interactions such that critical transaction-specific informational resources 
can be of acceptable availability and quality (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998).  Furthermore, these 
types of networks reduce requisite safeguarding/monitoring of transactional assets and provide 
informal, socially based mechanisms that govern firm behavior (Uzzi, 1997).   
VCs provide informal monitoring and the U.K. institutional climate prefers informal 
monitoring of firms, resulting in better institutional fit.  Network-based gentlemanly capitalism 
in the U.K. should increase the positive impact of the venture capital syndicate backing the IPO 
firm by utilizing nonlegal sanctions, including trust, mutual dependence, and reputation as 
governance mechanisms within a VC syndicate (Lockett, Ucbasaran, and Butler, 2006).  Both 
Ahlstrom and Bruton (2006) and Makela and Maula (2005) argue that VC syndicates are 
embedded within broader international and institutional networks.  Makela and Maula (2005) 
found that commitment by a VC firm is contingent upon the degree to which the firm is 
embedded in a social network of relationships with the focal market.  These embedded firms take 
on longer-term decision bases than purely financial firms.  The authors attribute this finding to 
the reputation-related risks of relinquishing participation and commitment in the syndicate.  
Moreover, Ahlstrom and Bruton’s (2006) study finds that informal institutions act as substitutes 
in situations where there are less formal institutions.  The study expects informal network 
mechanisms to be a central element of VC firms’ future business practices.  Thus, networks can 
substitute for less formal institutional mechanisms and the U.K. prefers informal monitoring.  
The above arguments clearly suggest that VC syndicates are associated with network 
embeddedness and should be associated with IPOs that choose to list in the U.K.  
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Although VC syndication is common in both the U.S. and U.K. capital markets, there are 
considerable differences in the extent of agency conflicts associated with VC syndication in the 
two markets.  Syndication is a means by which VCs can share risk through portfolio 
diversification, since for a given funds’ size, syndication enables the spreading of capital across a 
greater number of investments.  However, syndication itself may create another agency problem 
related to the behavior of syndicate members, especially when they have different objectives and 
decision-making horizons (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1994).  Such principal-principal conflicts may 
be less prevalent in the U.K. VC syndicates for several reasons.  In the U.S., an IPO is primarily 
an exit strategy for VC firms and their success is measured on the basis of the IPO performance.  
Prior research clearly indicates that there is substantial pressure on VC firms in the U.S. to bring 
companies public, resulting in “undercooked” IPOs (Barnes, Cahill and McCarthy, 2003).  
Gompers (1996) refers to this behavior on the part of U.S. VCs as “grandstanding.”  On the other 
hand, U.K. VC firms tend to maintain their shareholdings in firms they take public and continue 
to play a certification and monitoring role.  U.K. VCs typically do not view IPOs as an 
opportunity for exit (Filatotchev et al., 2006).  Success for U.S. VCs is largely based upon the 
monetary success they enable their portfolio firms to achieve at IPO, while the reputations of 
VCs in U.K. capital markets seem to be contingent on how well they position their portfolio 
firms for longer-term success after IPO (Wright, Pruthi, and Lockett, 2003).  Further, the close 
geographical proximity of VCs in the U.K., being primarily based in London, and the dense 
informal network links also provide a mechanism for arbitration between the potentially diverse 
objectives of syndicate partners (Robbie, Wright and Chiplin, 1997), mitigating anticipated 
conflicts of interest within a syndicate. Reputational considerations of syndicate members that 
are so important in the U.K., plus longer-term collaboration among syndicate members, suggest 
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that investors’ perception of the extent of principal-principal conflict within the syndicate will be 
lower in IPOs in the U.K., other things being equal.  As a result, foreign firms with larger 
syndicate backings are likely to prefer the U.K. capital markets due to greater post IPO 
involvement by VCs.  Hence,  
 Hypothesis 5: Foreign IPOs with syndicated venture capital investors are more 
likely to list in the U.K. 
 
Board interlocks 
 Our previous arguments focused on the monitoring and control aspects of corporate 
governance and their impact on the agency costs associated with foreign IPOs.  The resource 
dependence and strategic change perspectives suggest that corporate governance factors may also 
play resource and strategic roles in the decision-making process (Zahra and Pearce, 1989).  More 
specifically, strategy research emphasizes the importance of the board’s service and strategic roles 
when the firm faces a highly uncertain environment (Daily and Dalton, 1994; Chaganti, Mahajan, 
and Sharma, 1985).  In particular, the links that non-executive directors have with a firm’s 
environment can prove useful in obtaining financial resources needed for growth, restructuring 
expertise, and establishing relationships with a variety of stakeholders (Pfeffer, 1972; Pearce and 
Zahra, 1991; Provan, 1980).  These links are directly related to board ties, measured in terms of the 
number of outside directorships (‘interlocks’), each individual board member holds in other 
organizations both within the industry and outside (Dalton et al., 1998; Filatotchev and Bishop, 
2002; Pfeffer, 1972). Companies with greater growth opportunities are expected to gain most by 
having their directors serve on the boards of other companies (Beatty and Zajac, 1994).  
 A comparison of the institutional environments of the U.S. and U.K. suggests that board 
interlocks are more likely to be considered legitimate by investors in the U.K. capital market for 
a number of reasons.  Given the greater emphasis placed on network relationships in the U.K. 
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and the relatively more important roles that informal networks play in the City of London, 
foreign IPOs led by board members with a large number of external board memberships may 
find a better fit with the U.K. environment.  Investors in the U.K. market consider firms with 
boards who possess extensive interlocks not only a resource, but also a mechanism to gain 
legitimacy and acceptance among investors.  Rao, Davis, and Ward (2000) indicate that board 
interlocks may serve as an infrastructure for cohesion and as a mechanism enabling the 
communication and transfer of norms and values.  
 In the U.S., on the other hand, board interlocks may have less salience because of the 
regulatory focus on the monitoring and control functions of independent directors.  More 
specifically, the absolute number of directors and their external directorships may provide a 
negative effect on investors’ assessment of firm quality.  In other words, investors may believe 
that board size and external links of directors beyond a certain threshold may compromise 
directors’ effectiveness and the time directors are able to allocate to the focal firm (Daily, 
Johnson, and Dalton, 1999). 
Based on the above comparison, we contend that due to the U.S. market’s reliance on 
arm’s length market transactions compared to the informal institutions governing the U.K. 
capital market, board interlocks may be more salient and considered more legitimate in the U.K.  
Indeed, foreign IPOs with enhanced board interlocks will achieve greater fit with institutional 
environments characterized by network embeddedness.  Hence,  
Hypothesis 6:  Foreign IPOs with more board interlocks are more likely to list in the 
U.K. 
 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Sample selection 
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Our study focuses exclusively on foreign issuers, which are not listed on any exchange, 
including their home country, prior to their U.S. or U.K. initial public offer.  Consistent with a 
number of studies focusing on this unique population of firms (Bell et al., 2008; Bruner, 
Chaplinsky and Ramchand, 2006; Kadiyala and Subrahmanyam, 2002; Ejara, Ghosh, and Nunn, 
1999), we used Thomson Financial’s Security Data Corporation (SDC) New Issues database to 
identify all foreign firms that made initial public offerings in the U.S and U.K. markets between 
2002 and 2006.  We classified “foreign” in both the U.S. and U.K samples to be those companies 
incorporated and whose primary executive offices are located outside of the U.S., for the U.S. 
sample, and outside the U.K. for the U.K. sample.
3
  We excluded from the sample firms whose 
stock listings resulted from mergers or acquisitions, spin-offs of publicly listed firms, and units, 
warrants, and rights offerings.  We also followed the selection procedures outlined by Bruner et 
al., (2006) by removing all new issues of foreign utility firms from consideration.  Finally, we 
eliminated U.S. or U.K. financial service firms incorporated in Bermuda, Bahamas, and Cayman 
Islands from consideration, as firms based in these countries often choose to incorporate in these 
countries for tax purposes alone.  After identifying the sample of foreign IPOs made on U.S. and 
U.K. exchanges between 2002 and 2006, we referred to each offering firm’s prospectus to 
acquire our governance and control variables.  We selected the period after introduction of SOX 
in the U.S. because it marked growing differences in regulatory approaches to corporate 
governance in the U.K. and U.S.  Our final sample includes 103 and 99 foreign IPOs in the U.S. 
and U.K., respectively.  Table 1 provides sample characteristics. 
  
                                                 
3
 Our definition of a foreign IPO includes UK firms listed in the US and US firms listed in the UK. This small sub-
sample of firms makes a choice between listing at home and abroad compared to other IPOs that chose between the 
two foreign markets. To address this issue we ran the models without US firms in the UK sample and UK firms in 
the US sample and obtained the same results. 
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---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
 
Measures 
Dependent variable 
Our research question is aimed at identifying those factors that predict the likelihood that a firm 
will choose the U.S. or U.K. exchanges for their initial public offering.  Therefore, the dependent 
variable in our study is binary: whether a foreign firm makes their IPO on the U.S. or U.K. 
exchanges between 2002 and 2006.  We coded foreign IPOs listed on U.S. exchanges as 1 and 
U.K. listed foreign IPOs as 0. 
Independent variables   
Founder-CEO was a dummy variable, coded as 1 if one of the original founders of a company 
was the CEO at the time the company went public.  Executive Stock Options was dummy coded 
as 1 if stock options were offered to the CEO prior to the firm’s IPO (Certo et. al. 2003; Beatty 
and Zajac, 1994).  We measured Board Independence as the percentage of independent directors 
each firm had at IPO (Carpenter et al., 2003; Certo et al., 2001), as identified in the offering 
prospectuses.  We measured Board Interlocks as the sum of directorships of all board members 
(Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002).  Underwriter Prestige was measured based on the ratings 
assigned to the underwriters by Carter and Manaster (1990) and Carter et al., (1998), after the 
modifications suggested by Loughran and Ritter (2004).  Finally, we measured Venture Capital 
Syndication as the number of venture capital firms involved in an IPO.  We identified the 
presence of VC backing by first referencing the “Principal Stockholders” section of each 
prospectus and then verifying those VCs we identified against “The Venture One Venture 
Capital Source Book” to ensure the shareholder was indeed a venture capital firm.   
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Control variables 
To account for the different size and scale of firms likely to list on U.S. exchanges (NYSE and 
NASDAQ) and U.K. exchanges (LSE and AIM), we controlled for a host of firm characteristics.  
We controlled for the effects of firm age by taking the difference in years between the IPO firm’s 
founding date and the date of the IPO (Daily et al., 2005).  We also controlled for organizational 
size and issue size.  We measured firm size as revenue at time of IPO and IPO size as total 
proceeds from the initial public offering, less fees and expenses associated with the underwriter, 
investment bank, and auditor (Sanders and Boivie, 2004).  We expect that larger and older IPOs 
would prefer to list in the U.S. because of the relatively larger size of the U.S. stock market. 
 Although not directly related to our theoretical framework, we also controlled for certain 
leadership, ownership, and firm characteristics that previous studies have identified to be 
generally associated with U.S. IPOs.  Despite arguments against CEOs holding dual roles as 
chief executive and board president (Fama and Jensen, 1983), as many as 80% of Fortune 500 
firms have a CEO serving as chairman (Rechner and Dalton, 1991).  To account for this, we 
coded the CEO duality variable as 1 if the CEO held dual positions and 0 otherwise.  Similar to 
CEO duality, blockholder sell-off is characteristic of the short-term orientation of U.S. capital 
markets (Pound 1988; Stiglitz 1985).  We identified blockholder sell-off as the percentage 
change in blockholder shares on the day of IPO.  Finally, previous studies have suggested that 
knowledge-intensive, innovative firms are more likely to favor the U.S. over their domestic 
capital market (Hursti and Maula, 2007; Pagano et al., 2002; Blass and Yafeh, 2001).  The first 
of our two measures to account for knowledge-intensive, innovative firms is a dichotomous 
variable indicating whether the IPO operates in a high tech industry or not (Daily et al., 2005).  
Firms operating in high technology industry sectors were coded as 1, while those in low-
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technology industry sectors were coded as 0.  The second measure we used to account for 
knowledge-intensive, innovative firms was to control for the total number of patents which were 
awarded to each firm prior to IPO.  
 Additional variables were incorporated into the data analysis to control for institutional 
proximity effects and country of origin effects.  We controlled for foreign IPOs that originated 
from U.K. Commonwealth Nations and North America based on the assumption that firms would 
choose to list in countries that share common historical and cultural legacy or are closer to their 
country of origin.  We also controlled for foreign IPOs that originated from emerging economy 
countries to account for country of origin effects based on Hoskisson et al. (2000).  Finally, to 
control for differences between secondary and primary markets, both within and between 
countries, we included a dummy variable for foreign IPOs that listed on a main market (NYSE or 
LSE) versus a secondary market (NASDAQ or AIM).  These controls were incorporated because 
differences between primary and secondary markets could influence the likelihood to go public 
in a certain market (Rao, Davis, and Ward, 2000) and in a certain country.   
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
We tested our hypotheses using the logistic regression model (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000; 
Wright, 1995) and general estimating equations.  Logistic regression allowed us to assess how 
well our set of predictor variables explains a firm’s decision to list on the U.S. versus U.K. stock 
exchanges, based on the sign of beta coefficients associated with a particular independent 
variable.  We coded IPOs that listed in the U.S. as 1 and U.K. IPOs as 0.  Consequently, a 
positive (+) coefficient suggests the independent variable is predictive of U.S. IPOs, while a 
negative (-) coefficient is interpreted as being predictive of U.K. IPOs.  Logistic regression 
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provides an indication of the relative importance of each predictor variable as well as the 
model’s accuracy of classifying observations.    
Table 2 contains descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables used in the study.  
Revenues Prior to the IPO, CEO Duality, and Executive Stock Options variables were strongly 
correlated with VC Syndication.  While there is no formal way to test for multicollinearity in 
logistic regression, the bivariate correlations between independent variables are well below the 
0.85 rule of thumb (Leahy, 2000).  We ran models with all possible combinations of variables 
that had high levels of correlation with VC Syndication and found no significant change in size 
of beta coefficients and no changes in signs or significances.  Finally, we inspected the residuals 
for evidence of outliers.  We had one observation with a high residual (-3.343).  Since this 
observation had no substantive effect on the model results when removed from the dataset, we 
retained it in the final analysis. 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
 
In order to test our hypotheses, we examined the beta coefficients and odds ratios for 
individual variables.  The betas presented in Table 3 are the values that would be used in an 
equation to calculate the probability of a case falling into a specific category.  According to 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2007: 461), the odds ratio represents the change in odds of being in one 
of the categories of outcome when the value of a predictor increases by one unit, all other factors 
equal.  For odds ratios that are less than 1 and accompany a negative beta, we have inverted the 
odds ratio to aid interpretation.   
Model 1 in Table 3 presents the results of the logistic regression with our control 
variables.  Model 1 suggests that larger firms, based on firm revenues (β= 0.0001, p<.01), are 
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more likely to list in the U.S.  Also, CEO duality (β=1.81, p<0.001), high tech industries 
(β=1.20, p<0.05), and firms with more patents (β= 0.05, p<0.05) tend to choose U.S. markets.  
Additionally, firms from emerging economies (β=1.39, p<0.01) and North America (β= 2.03, 
p<0.05) were more likely to list in the U.S., while firms from U.K. Commonwealth nations (β= -
2.30, p<0.01) and those choosing a main market (β= -2.79, p<0.01) were more likely to list in the 
U.K., suggesting significant country of origin and institutional proximity effects.  Alternatively, 
we found that blockholder sell-off (β=-0.02, p<0.01) was associated with a U.K. listing. 
 Model 2, the full-unrestricted model, in which we entered the control variables and our 
hypothesized variables, demonstrates effective classification of U.S. and U.K. IPOs based on our 
independent variables.  The model significantly predicts market choice for the IPOs in our 
sample (chi-square =23.0.65, p<0.001) with a change in the log likelihood of 23.04 (p < 0.001).  
Furthermore, the variables included in the model accurately identify characteristics of U.S. 
listings (sensitivity = 98.0%) and U.K. listings (specificity=96.4%), resulting in a Percentage 
Accuracy Classification score of 97.3%. 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
 
We found support for H1 based on our results that firms with a founder-CEO were more 
likely to file IPOs in the U.K. (β=-4.88, p<0.05).  The odds ratio indicates that when a firm’s 
founder is CEO, the odds the firm will list in the U.K. are 100 (1/0.01) times higher than firms 
whose CEO is not a founder.  We found support for H2, which argued that executive stock 
options would be associated with U.S. IPOs (β=12.77, p<0.01).  The odds a firm that provides 
CEO stock options will list in the U.S. are 352.49 times higher than firms without CEO stock 
options.  Given the non-significant, negative Beta for Board Independence (β=-8.02, p<0.10), we 
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failed to find support for H3, which argued that higher levels of board independence would be 
associated with U.S. IPOs. 
Our results show that the use of prestigious underwriters would be associated with IPOs 
that list in the U.S. (β=0.96, p<0.001), in line with H4.  In fact, we find for every one-unit 
increase in underwriter’s rankings, the odds of listing in the U.S. increase by a factor of 2.62.  
We also found support for H5, which argued that higher levels of VC syndication would be 
associated with U.K. IPOs (β=-0.54, p<0.05).  By taking the inverse of the odds ratio for VC 
syndication, we find the odds that a firm backed by a larger VC syndicate will list in the U.K. are 
1.72 (1/0.58 = 1.72) times higher than the odds that the firm will list in the U.S., for each 
additional member of the VC syndicate.  Finally, the empirical results provide support for H6, 
which argued that board interlocks characterize IPOs listed on U.K. exchanges (β=-2.99, 
p<0.01).  By taking the inverse of the odds ratio for board interlocks, the results suggest that for 
each interlock a board member adds, the odds of a firm making their initial public offering in the 
U.K. increase by a factor of 20 (1/0.05 = 20).   
DISCUSSION  
The results of our study suggest that foreign firms contemplating a new equity offer would tend 
to select a host market where there is a “fit” between its characteristics and existing affiliations 
and the host market’s institutional environment.  The basis for evaluating such fit with a host 
country’s financial markets is the extent to which firm attributes and characteristics meet 
legitimacy standards in host markets.  However, the value placed by investors on specific firm 
attributes are likely to vary from one market to another because the norms and expectations of 
host market participants are, to a great extent, shaped by the institutional context of that country.  
Given the differences in institutional contexts between the U.S. and U.K. institutional 
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environments, our research indicates that the value of specific internal governance characteristics 
and external ties will vary from one location to another.   
Historically, firms were largely legally confined to offer their shares only on the 
exchanges of their country of origin.  However, decreased regulation along with increased 
competition for financing sources has prompted firms from foreign countries to bypass domestic 
exchanges and look to the financial markets of the U.S. and the U.K.  Our data suggests that 
firms from different parts of the world are increasingly foregoing their domestic capital markets 
and accessing foreign markets.  The makeup of firms seeking new sources of equity financing 
suggests that these firms range from mature and well-established to entrepreneurial ventures 
seeking to establish themselves.  In addition to wide variances in age and size, these foreign 
firms differ with regard to investor familiarity.  Yet, despite these differences, each foreign firm 
attempting an equity listing in western capital markets is trying to appeal to investors and 
maximize the value of their new issue.  
The literature in international business has long recognized that firms experience costs of 
doing business abroad that are not experienced by local firms (Hymer, 1976).  Apart from the 
market-driven economic costs, firms incur social costs of access and acceptance (Zaheer, 2002) 
when attempting to do business in a foreign country.  The social costs of being a “stranger in a 
strange land” are usually referred to as liability of foreignness and arise because of unfamiliarity 
hazards, discrimination hazards, and relational hazards (Eden and Miller, 2004).  In the case of 
firms undertaking their IPO on foreign stock exchanges, the liability of foreignness is 
compounded by the “liability of newness” (Certo, 2003).  Analogous to the arguments of Sanders 
and Boivie (2004) in the context of IPOs in emerging industries, investors and analysts lack the 
codified body of knowledge and country-specific experience that is necessary for a systematic 
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evaluation of foreign IPO firms.  Although the concepts of liability of foreignness and liability of 
newness were developed in the context of product markets, they are quite salient in the case of 
firms competing in foreign capital markets due to the well-documented existence of “home bias” 
within financial markets.  “Home bias” refers the tendency among investors to neglect the 
portfolio benefits associated with international diversification and allocate a relatively large 
fraction of their wealth in domestic equities (Grubel, 1968; Levy and Sarnat, 1970; Solnik, 1974; 
Grauer and Hakansson, 1987).  Given that foreign new issues are fully aware of the problems 
associated with liabilities of foreignness and newness, our research suggests that their efforts will 
be focused on overcoming these liabilities and making their IPO a success.    
Our paper makes several important contributions to the literature on institutional 
differences in general and to the growing body of studies on governance and IPOs in the 
management area in particular.  The increasing globalization of capital markets makes the choice 
of capital markets an important area of study for strategy scholars.  However, to the best of our 
knowledge, no prior studies have examined how foreign firms can distinguish between the U.S. 
and U.K. capital markets and make informed strategic choices regarding the placement of their 
first public equity offers.  To that extent, we believe our study can serve as a point of departure 
for future studies of capital market choices and institutional influences on the capital market 
strategies of firms.  Second, the results of our study demonstrate that the salience of governance 
signals can vary significantly even between two common law countries.  We attribute such 
variance to differences in institutional environments and suggest that these institutional 
differences can be more subtle and more nuanced than generally assumed.  However, the 
differences between the regulatory environments of U.S. and U.K. capital markets become most 
observable when foreign firms attempt to exploit the capital market resources of the two markets.  
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Indeed, by focusing on the disparities between the regulatory institutions of the U.S. and U.K., 
our study adds to the manner in which we may evaluate formal and informal institutions (North, 
1990; Glaeser et al., 2004).  A country’s regulatory institutions are considered the easiest for 
foreign firms to observe and adhere to (Eden and Miller, 2004), simply because rules and 
procedures are frequently codified.  On the other hand, our study suggests that comparisons of 
governance regulations across countries may inadequately account for the informal and 
normative nature of some institutional environments.  While the Combined Code (2010) does 
present an outward display of codified rules with regard to governance policies, there is 
considerably less distinction between regulative and normative institutions found in the 
“gentlemanly capitalism” practices of the U.K. capital market.  
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
When interpreting the results of our study, it is important to bear in mind some of its limitations.  
First, despite the prominence of New York and London, firms are not restricted to the exchanges 
of these two markets.  Indeed, today firms can choose to raise equity capital on the exchanges of 
a number of prominent markets, such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Tokyo, and Toronto, in addition 
to regional exchanges such as Dubai.  Our data is limited to the information that can be garnered 
from the prospectuses of the examined firms.  For example, we did not find any significant 
effects of the Board Independence variable.  However, it was used as a measure of board 
monitoring capability, which is a crude proxy for a complex process of interactions between 
board members (Chaganti et al., 1985; Dalton et al., 1998).  In addition, relying heavily on a 
firm’s prospectus highlights the cross sectional design of the study, thereby raising considerable 
caution in making inferences of causality.  The prospectus also limits our ability to examine the 
process of strategic decision-making by the firms in our sample, because we cannot examine 
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how the process unfolds over time. Therefore, given that capital market choices unfold over time 
and are subject to a number of formal and informal influences, we believe richer insights can be 
developed about the content of these strategic decisions by studying the underlying processes.  
These limitations notwithstanding, we believe that the high explanatory power and resultant 
correct classifications suggest that our model is well specified. 
 There are a number of promising directions in which the future study of capital market 
choices can be extended.  First, given that our study focused on choice between two common law 
countries, it would be interesting to investigate the factors that influence the choice between 
common and civil law countries.  Additionally, investigating the interdependent nature of signals 
surrounding a new issue may provide rich new insights about the behavior of firms and capital 
markets.  Indeed, certain combinations of signals may be quite necessary in certain institutional 
contexts, while less salient in others.  Additionally, examining the performance consequences of 
capital market choices will be helpful to practicing managers who bear the responsibility to make 
this crucial choice.  
Our study suggests that capital markets can have different “institutional logics.”  
Institutional logics are social mechanisms that shape the way societal actors view the legitimacy 
of organizations (Zajac and Westphal, 2004b).  Scholars conceptualize institutional logics along 
multiple dimensions, such as markets (Dunn and Jones, 2010).  An institutional logic “guides 
organizing and provides actors with vocabularies, identities, and rationales for action” (Dunn and 
Jones, 2010: 114).  Thus, our study finds that U.S. and U.K. institutional environments differ in 
terms of their respective institutional logics in relation to corporate governance and capital 
markets.  Future research should examine the role of differing institutional logics, boundaries, 
 41 
support mechanisms, and constraining mechanisms and their impact on capital market 
participants. 
CONCLUSION 
A firm’s initial choice of capital market in which to make its first public equity offer is an 
important domain choice that may impact its growth and development in the long-run. Our paper 
offers theoretical and empirical insights into how firms make their IPO market decision when 
they consider a listing outside their home markets. By combining IPO research with institutional 
perspective, we offer a richer theoretical framework that suggests that economic rationale behind 
these choices should be analyzed within a more contextualized approach that focuses on issues 
related to institutional fit. A more contextualized approach offers a number of further research 
avenues that may lead to a more holistic view of the complex inter-relationship between 
governance and key strategic decisions.
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Table 1 
Sample Characteristics 
 
Issuing Year
Foreign IPOs 
on U.S. 
Exchanges
Foreign IPOs 
on U.K. 
Exchanges
2006 30 38
2005 31 40
2004 28 18
2003 7 1
2002 7 2
Home Market
Origin of IPO Firm
Foreign IPOs 
on U.S. 
Exchanges
Foreign IPOs 
on U.K. 
Exchanges
Asia/Pacific 45 30
Europe 19 33
Middle East/ Africa 11 11
Latin America 22 5
North America 6 20
BRIC countries* 34 7
Emerging Economies** 48 23
Developed Economies 55 76
Industry Characteristics
Foreign IPOs 
on U.S. 
Exchanges
Foreign IPOs 
on U.K. 
Exchanges
Mining 7 12
Food/Drink Preparation 4 5
Healthcare 7 9
Production 28 16
Communications 7 9
Computer related 28 19
Transportation 16 8
Real Estate 0 6
Insurance 4 10
other 2 5
Host Market
Host Market
 
 
Notes: * indicates BRIC countries: Brazil, Russia, India, and China.  
** indicates emerging economies according to Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, and Wright (2000)
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Variable  Mean  SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1 US_IPO 0.51 0.50
2 Age 7.96 9.18 -0.016
3 Blockholder Sell Off -0.31 0.02 -0.109 0.11
4 Revenues $292.8M $1.11B .218
** 0.012 0.129
5 CEO Duality 0.39 0.49 .333
** -0.079 -0.009 0.06
6 High Tech Industry 0.44 0.50 .187
** 0.008 0.129 0.015 0.097
7 Patents 17.66 184.83 0.082 0.088 0.071 .302
** 0.099 0.102
8 Emerging Economy 0.31 0.46 .356
** -0.066 0.05 0.135 .195
** 0.105 -0.047
9 U.K. Commonwealth 0.23 0.42 -.245
** -0.002 0.024 -0.033 -0.087 -0.123 -0.03 -.210
**
10 North America 0.06 0.25 -0.024 0.043 -0.124 -0.026 0.1 0.013 -0.015 -.176
*
.483
**
11 NYSE or LSE IPO 0.22 0.42 .362
** -0.002 -0.09 .327
** -0.014 -.257
** -0.042 .158
* -0.094 -0.044
12 Founder = CEO 0.35 0.48 0.02 -0.021 -0.023 -0.138 .234
**
.232
** -0.051 .161
*
-.159
* -0.041 -.149
*
13 Executive Stock Options 0.85 0.36 .382
** 0.056 -0.099 0.101 0.089 0.014 0.039 0.048 0.037 0.057 0.132 -0.063
14 Board Independence 0.40 0.23 .217
** 0.126 -0.083 0.002 0.021 -0.058 0.035 -0.004 0.012 0.077 0.096 0.002 .194
**
15 Board Interlocks 6.13 10.83 -.404
** -0.005 0.081 -0.082 -.196
** -0.018 -0.04 -0.085 0.08 -0.059 -.195
** -0.095 -0.023 -0.092
16 Underwriter Prestige 5.35 3.70 .794
** 0.013 -0.054 .169
*
.199
**
.218
** 0.084 .333
**
-.252
** -0.05 .402
** 0.077 .339
**
.176
*
-.206
**
17 VC Syndication 2.59 3.41 -0.061 -0.072 0.122 -0.123 0.043 0.129 -0.051 0.069 0.041 -0.01 -0.121 -0.002 0.018 -0.103 -0.023 -0.043  
 
Notes:  * correlation significant at 0.05 level;** correlation significant at 0.01 level. 
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TABLE 3 
Results of Logistic Regression Analysis for IPO Stock Market Choice 
Variable Odds Ratio
Control Variables
Age 0.00 -0.18 0.83
Blockholder Sell Off -0.02 ** 0.02 1.02
Revenues 0.00 * 0.00 * 1.00
CEO Duality 1.81 *** 4.47 * 87.67
High Tech 1.20 * 5.09 * 163.16
Patents 0.05 * -0.04 * 0.96
Emerging Economy 1.39 ** -1.94 0.14
U.K. Commonwealth Nation -2.30 ** -8.53 0.00
North America 2.03 * 0.57 1.76
Main Market IPO (NYSE OR LSE) -2.79 *** 1.21 3.36
Predictors
H1: Founder-CEO -4.88 * 0.01
H2: Executive Stock Options 12.77 ** 352.49
H3: Board Independence -8.02 † 0.00
H4: Underwriter Prestige 0.96 ** 2.62
H5: VC Syndication -0.54 * 0.58
H6: Board Interlocks -2.99 ** 0.05
Goodness of Fit
 -2 Log Likelihood 149.99 *** 23.04 ***
Chi-square 103.71 *** 230.65. ***
Cox & Snell R2 43.30% 71.60%
Nagelkerke R2 57.70% 95.50%
Classification Accuracy
Percentage Accuracy Classification 82.5% 97.30%
Positive Predictive Value (US IPO) 83.0% 98.00%
Negative Predictive Value (UK IPO) 81.9% 96.40%
Model 2Model 1
Beta Coefficients
 
† p < 0.10 
* p < 0.05 
** p < 0.01 
***p<0.001 
